I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most profound changes in corporate governance over the last decade has been the shift in the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Initially limited primarily to the task of ensuring adequate disclosure, the SEC mostly played a marginal role in the substance of corporate governance. 1 It was left to the states to determine the rights and obligations of directors and shareholders. Aborted efforts by the SEC in the 1980s to engage in substantive rulemaking through the medium of listing standards were met with emphatic rejection by the courts. 1 Much of the history of the SEC's role in the corporate governance area, including the emphasis on disclosure, is discussed in J. Robert Brown, Jr., Essay: Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Limits of Disclosure, 57 CATH. U. L. REV.
(2007).
2 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating Rule 19c-4 on the basis that it exceeded the Commission's rulemaking authority through the imposition of substantive corporate governance requirements).
An examination of staff interpretations under the exclusion show that they shift significantly from administration to administration, particularly with changes in the political makeup of the agency. Congress contemplated that the five-person Commission would include representatives of both major parties. 21 When at a full complement, the Commission typically consists of three members from the party of the current administration and two members from the other major party. 22 The replacement of a single member can cause the regulatory philosophy of the administrative agency to change.
During Republican administrations, interpretive views under Rule 14a-8 tend to minimize or eliminate consideration of social policy and more broadly allow for exclusion of shareholder proposals. During Democratic administrations, the situation is reversed. Social policy is read broadly to favor shareholders and effectively restricts management's ability to exclude proposals. Given these countervailing views, the positions of the staff often 18 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). 19 Id. (allowing for exclusion if "the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations"). 20 See infra note 44. 21 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2011) ("Not more than three of such commissioners shall be members of the same political party, and in making appointments members of different political parties shall be appointed alternately as nearly as may be practicable."). 22 See http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm. Although this is the practice, the statute does not actually require representation of both parties; it only requires that one party not have more than three positions. The President could, for example, insert persons who describe their affiliation as "independent." Thus, Mary Schapiro, who was appointed to the Commission in 1988, and again as chair in 2009, is listed as independent. When a new administration takes office, a president can theoretically confront a Commission with three members from the party of the prior administration. Moreover, the President cannot unilaterally remove those commissioners. Although Section 4 of the Exchange Act does not specifically limit removal to cause, the restriction has generally been assumed. But see Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (assuming President could only remove commissioners appointed to the SEC for cause); see id. (dissenting opinion by Justice Bryer) (arguing that law was not clear that President could only remove commissioners for cause). As a practical matter, however, the chairman appointed by the prior administration typically resigns, providing the new President with an immediate appointment and ability to shift the political balance of power on the Commission. See infra note 132. Nonetheless, the assertion of control by the new administration can take time. See infra note 78.
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The Politicization of Corporate Governance 505 change following the advent of a new administration, sometimes leading to the reversal of previously adopted policies. Political influence does not operate in a straight-line fashion. 23 The ability to alter staff positions depends upon a variety of factors, including the importance of the issue, the particular views and personalities of the incumbent Commissioners, and the dynamics associated with collaborative decision making. Commissioners may need time to build coalitions favoring a particular position. 24 Moreover, with Commissioners serving five year terms, 25 a newly elected President often must wait several years before appointing a majority to the Commission. 26 Finally, political influence has a logistical component, with the opportunity to intervene affected by the particular proposals submitted by shareholders and management's response. 27 This Article will examine the phenomenon of political influence in the context of shareholder proposals. After providing a bit of history on Rule 14a-8 and the "ordinary business" exclusion, this Article will look at shifts in interpretations that occurred from administration to administration. This Article will use as a case study the administrative approach taken with respect to proposals seeking shareholder ratification of outside auditors. Although the SEC supported and encouraged shareholder involvement in this area for more than a half century, the staff quietly abandoned the policy in 2005 by concluding that the practice amounted to an "ordinary business" activity of the company. 28 The staff never provided any rationale for the shift. 29 Nonetheless, the altered position had two possible explanations. It could have been a consequence of the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The Act assigned 23 Although each administration typically has three members of its own party on the Commission, see supra note 22, these individuals do not always have the same regulatory philosophy and do not always vote as a block. See Investment Company Act Release No. 26520 (July 27, 2004) (approving governance requirements for investment companies by a 3-2 vote, with commissioners Donaldson (R), Goldschmid (D) and Campos (D) favoring the proposal and commissioners Atkins (R) and Glassman (R) opposing it). 24 This appears to have occurred, for example, with respect to the positions taken by the Commission with respect to Cracker Barrel. While one Commissioner favored change, it took a number of years before the entire Commission agreed on an appropriate strategy and reversed the position taken by the prior Commission. 27 See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(j) (specifying procedures that must be undertaken to obtain staff approval of the right to omit a shareholder proposal from the proxy statement). Management seeking to delete a proposal generally must obtain staff permission. Companies do not always challenge shareholder proposal. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Rule 14a-8, the Ordinary Business Exclusion, and the Need for Reform: Bank Policies and Loan Foreclosures (Part 4), THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Apr. 1, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/thesec-governance/2011/4/1/rule-14a-8-the-ordinary-business-exclusion-and-the-need-for-1.html (discussing shareholder proposal submitted to large banks where some sought exclusion and some did not). 28 See infra note 139. 29 See, e.g., Rite Aid Corp., infra note 145.
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Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 2 to audit committees of listed companies the power to select the firm's auditor. 30 Some issuers seeking exclusion argued that shareholder ratification interfered with the carefully crafted role of this committee. 31 The justification was, however, an exceedingly thin reed on which to rest such a significant shift in a longstanding policy. Moreover, the approach conflicted with actual practice and did not take into account the ongoing public debate over auditor independence. 32 The more likely explanation was the shift in the political composition of the Commission following the elections in 2000. 33 The Article will end with some recommendations on reforms designed to reduce governance volatility, which mostly center around a reduction in staff discretion. In the context of the "ordinary business" exclusion, this foremost means the development of transparent standards. Alternatively, it means a fundamental redesign in the nature of the exclusion in order to reduce the staff's interpretive role.
II. RULE 14A-8 AND THE "ORDINARY BUSINESS" EXCLUSION

A. The Development of the "Ordinary Business" Exclusion
Rule 14a-8 emerged in 1942, eight years after Congress gave the SEC the authority to adopt proxy rules. 34 The Rule extended to shareholders the right to include proposals in the company's proxy statement. Commonly viewed as an enfranchising mechanism, the rule was in fact designed to assist management by resolving a significant disclosure issue under the antifraud provision in the proxy rules. , at *4 (Jan. 12, 1940) (amending Schedule 14A to require the person making a proxy solicitation to identify, in item 16, any other matters he is aware will be raised at the meeting and his proposed disposition of the proxies solicited with respect to those matters).
35 Rule 14a-9 prohibits misleading disclosure in the context of the proxy process. See 17 § C.F.R. 240.14a-9 (2011). In the early days of the proxy rules, management aware that shareholders intended to submit proposals or nominees at the meeting had an obligation under this antifraud provision to disclose the fact in their proxy materials. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The SEC, Corporate Governance, and Shareholder Access to the Boardroom, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1339, 1343 n. 19 (2008). The shareholder proposal rule was adopted at least in part to alleviate management's obligation in this area. Id. at 1345. ("More immediately, they solved a serious problem, providing ground rules for the disclosure of shareholder proposals but shifting the burden from management back to the proposing shareholders."). The concern can still occasionally surface. See Grimes v. Ohio Edison Co., 992 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993) ("American Brands stands for the proposition that the omission of a proposal from proxy materials that was not properly excluded under Rule 14a-8(c) makes the proxy inherently misleading under Rule 14a-9.").
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From the outset, the Rule contained exclusions for certain categories of shareholder proposals. The earliest was the right to delete proposals not deemed to be "a proper subject for action" by shareholders. The exclusion was a narrow one. The burden of establishing availability fell to management and required affirmative evidence. 36 With the contours of the exclusion mostly turning on the parameters of state law, the staff retained little interpretive discretion.
37
That changed with the addition of the "ordinary business" exclusion in 1954. 38 The exclusion arose out of principles of state law. 39 With states assigning day-to-day oversight of the company's business to the board, 40 proposals could be excluded if they interfered with management's authority.
41
36 See Exchange Act Release No. 4979, 1954 WL 5772 (Jan. 6, 1954) ("The rule places the burden of proof upon the management to show that a particular security holder's proposal is not a proper one for inclusion in management's proxy material. Where management contends that a proposal may be omitted because it is not proper under state law, it will be incumbent upon management to refer to the applicable statute or case law and furnish a supporting opinion of counsel."). Thus, in In re Union Electric Company, 38 SEC 921 (1959), the SEC approved the omission of proposals as not proper subjects for shareholders. Both involved proposals that would have violated state law. See id. ("One proposal would permit a minor stockholder to vote by proxy. Union has submitted an opinion of counsel indicating that under Missouri law a minor may not appoint an agent. The second proposal would require the company to accord to the parent or guardian of a minor stockholder all rights incident to the ownership of stock. The opinion of Union's counsel indicates that such rights may not in all instances legally be exercisable by the parent or guardian.").
37 See The SEC Today Released an Opinion of Baldwin B. Bane, Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 1945 WL 27415, at *2 (Jan. 3, 1945) ("Speaking generally, it is the purpose of Rule X-14A-7 to place stockholders in a position to bring before their fellow stockholders matters of concern to them as stockholders in such corporation; that is, such matters relating to the affairs of the company concerned as are proper subjects for stockholders' action under the laws of the state under which it is organized."). The Commission staff interpreted the rule as bounded by state law from the outset. 41 See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 39, at 50,689 ("The general underlying policy of this exclusion is consistent with the policy of most state corporate laws: to confine the resolution of ORDINARY BUSINESS problems to management and the board of directors since it is impracticable for shareholders to decide how to solve such problems."); see also Notice of Proposed Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4950, 1953 WL 5756, at *2 (Oct. 9, 1953) ("In order to relieve the management of the necessity of including in its proxy material security holder proposals which relate to matters falling within the province of the management, it is proposed to amend this rule so as to permit the omission of any proposal which consists of a recommendation or request that the management take
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As a practical matter, however, the dearth of state law on the issue 42 effectively gave to the staff complete discretion to determine the relative division of power between shareholders and managers.
43
The application of the exclusion was initially a relatively straightforward matter. 44 The staff looked to such factors as the fundamental importance of the task to management, 45 the impracticability of shareholders resolving the issue, 46 and the lack of shareholder expertise on the subject matter of the proposal. 47 Likewise, the SEC sometimes explained that the exclusion was designed to prevent shareholders from micro-managing the business of the corporation. 48 This early approach did not consider the social impact of the proposal and allowed for the exclusion of "matters of considerable importance to the action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer."). 42 Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, supra note 39, at 47,420 ("State law precedent, however, is rarely conclusive as to what is or is not ORDINARY BUSINESS, and the staff generally has had to make its own determination as to whether a proposal involves an activity relating to the issuer's ORDINARY BUSINESS."); see also Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 39, at 50,689 ("Although the policy is based on state law, it is not completely guided by it, due in part to an absence of state authority on many of the issues we are called upon to address."). 43 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,107 (May 21, 1998) ("The term refers to matters that are not necessarily 'ordinary' in the common meaning of the word, and is rooted in the corporate law concept providing management with flexibility in directing certain core matters involving the company's business and operations.").
44 See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 39, at 50,688-89 (describing exclusion in early days as "fairly straightforward" but noting that "proposals relating to such matters but focusing on significant social policy issues generally would not be considered to be excludable, because such issues typically fall outside the scope of management's prerogative"). 45 Id. at 50,688 ("Certain tasks are so fundamental to management's ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis that they could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder oversight. Examples include the management of the workforce, such as the hiring, promotion, and termination of employees, decisions on production quality and quantity, and the retention of suppliers."). 46 Id. at 50,689 ("The general underlying policy of this exclusion is consistent with the policy of most state corporate laws: to confine the resolution of ORDINARY BUSINESS problems to management and the board of directors, since it is impracticable for shareholders to decide how to solve such problems."). 47 Hearings on SEC Enforcement Problems Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. part 1, at 119 (1957) ("The basic reason for this policy is that it is manifestly impracticable in most cases for stockholders to decide management problems at corporate meetings."). 48 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 39, at 50,689 ("The second consideration relates to the degree to which the proposal seeks to 'micro-manage' the company by probing too deeply into matters of a complex nature upon which shareholders, as a group, would not be in a position to make an informed judgment. This consideration may come into play in a number of circumstances, such as where the proposal involves intricate detail, or seeks to impose specific time-frames or methods for implementing complex policies."); see also Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 39. As one court stated, "management cannot exercise its specialized talents effectively if corporate investors assert the power to dictate the minutiae of daily business decisions. 
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The Politicization of Corporate Governance 509 issuer and its security holders." 49 By the 1970s, the status quo became increasingly untenable, with shareholders pressuring to use Rule 14a-8 to promote public debate on corporate behavior. 50 On topics ranging from the manufacture of napalm 51 to the segregation of buses, 52 the proposals submitted by shareholders were intended to facilitate discussion on company practices that implicated matters of important social policy.
The SEC initially resisted efforts to allow these sorts of proposals, viewing the proxy process as an inappropriate forum for promoting public debate. 53 Pressure from investors, along with judicial intervention, eventually forced the agency's hand. In 1976, the SEC expressly acknowledged that the "ordinary business" exclusion would be modified by consideration of the social importance of the proposal, 54 something that would require the staff to "adjust its [interpretive] approach." 55 The change was not motivated by the requirements of state law. Indeed, such an exception to the board's authority to supervise day-to-day activities arguably did not exist under state law. 56 Instead, the SEC and the courts mostly sought to implement the intent of Congress in using the proxy rules 49 53 See SEC Today Released an Opinion of Baldwin B. Bane, supra note 37, at *2 ("It was not the intent of Rule X-14A-7 to permit stockholders to obtain the consensus of other stockholders with respect to matters which are of a general political, social or economic nature. Other forums exist for the presentation of such views."); see also Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, supra note 48, at 677 ("The Commission's release endorsed the Director's conclusion that 'proposals which deal with general political, social or economic matters are not, within the meaning of the rule, 'proper subjects for action by security holders.'"). 54 See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 39, at 14 ("However, proposals relating to such matters but focusing on significant social policy issues generally would not be considered to be excludable, because such issues typically fall outside the scope of management's prerogative.").
55 Id. at 12 ("Over the years, for instance, the Division has in several instances reversed its position on the excludability of proposals involving plant closings, the manufacture of tobacco products, executive compensation, and golden parachutes.") (footnotes omitted). The same release explicitly reversed the staff's position excluding proposals relating to employment practices a position that had previously been asserted in Cracker Barrel. Id. at 13 ("Return to a case-by-case approach should redress the concerns of shareholders interested in submitting for a vote by fellow shareholders employment-related proposals raising significant social issues.").
56 See Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("Laredef makes it amply clear that plaintiff's heavily stressed proposition that 'policy-making matters' are beyond the directors' control (an assertion he makes in his letter to the Commission and again in his Memorandum of Law) is not correct."). [Vol. 2 to promote the shareholder franchise. 57 However, without any guiding legal principles from state law, the public policy addendum was left entirely to the staff to define and interpret. 58 Thereafter, application of the "ordinary business" exclusion ostensibly required a two-step analysis. First, the staff had to assess whether the proposal involved excessive intrusion by shareholders into the affairs of management. Second, assuming that it did, the staff had to assess whether the importance of the subject matter was nonetheless sufficient to warrant inclusion of the proposal in the proxy statement.
59
In fact, there is little evidence that the two-step analysis routinely occurred. The staff never developed meaningful standards for delineating the relative roles of shareholders and managers. Nor was the concept of public interest ever defined. Disconnected from state law and devoid of any real standards, application of the "ordinary business" exclusion developed in an ad hoc and inconsistent fashion 60 that could result in tenuous determinations.
61
The result was substantial staff discretion. Yet the discretion did not exist in a vacuum. Rather than employ objective definitions or otherwise 57 See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, supra note 48, at 680-81 ("As our earlier discussion indicates, the clear import of the language, legislative history, and record of administration of section 14(a) is that its overriding purpose is to assure to corporate shareholders the ability to exercise their right -some would say their duty -to control the important decisions which affect them in their capacity as stockholders and owners of the corporation.").
58 See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 20091, 28 SEC Docket 798 (Aug. 16, 1983) ("Because this interpretation raises form over substance and renders the provisions of paragraph (c)(7) largely a nullity, the Commission has determined to adopt the interpretative change set forth in the Proposing Release. Henceforth, the staff will consider whether the subject matter of the special report or the committee involves a matter of ORDINARY BUSINESS; where it does, the proposal will be excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(7)."). For a time, the staff sought to avoid the interpretative difficulties by allowing proposals involving a company's ordinary business that merely called for reports however the SEC, however, abandoned that approach in 1983. ) The history of the change is described in ) (non-binding resolution endorsing the idea that defendant's employees should be allowed to retire after thirty years of service, regardless of age; proposal related to entire work force, not just senior management, and enhanced pension rights had "not yet captured public attention"). 60 Early commentary on the exclusion noted the possibility of such a result. See Hearings, supra note 47, at 118 ("Consistency with this premise requires that the phrase 'ordinary business operations' in Rule X-14A-8 have the meaning attributed to it under applicable State law. To hold otherwise would be to introduce into the rule the possibility of endless and narrow interpretations based on no ascertainable standards.").
61 See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 39, at 4 ("Although a few of the distinctions made in those cases may be somewhat tenuous, we believe that on the whole the benefit to shareholders and companies in providing guidance and informal resolutions will outweigh the problematic aspects of the few decisions in the middle ground.").
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The Politicization of Corporate Governance 511 devise the relevant standards, the staff instead took positions with respect to the ordinary business exclusion that were often explained by shifts in the political makeup of the Commission.
B. Arbitrating Disputes Between Shareholders and Managers
Staff interpretations of the "ordinary business" exclusion under Rule 14a-8 change regularly. These shifts often do not reflect a substantive revision in the meaning or breadth of the exclusion; rather, they more likely arise from the need to conform to the views of a majority of those sitting on the Commission. As a result, changes often occur following shifts in the political composition of the body.
The influence of the Commission on the staff can be deceptively hard to see. Commissioners most obviously become aware of staff positions under Rule 14a-8 through an appeal by the party dissatisfied with the position taken in the No-Action letter. 62 The staff typically notifies the Commission of the appeal and recommends that it be denied. As long as staff views comport with those of a majority of the Commission, the recommendation will be accepted and the appeal disallowed. Non-review, therefore, signals acquiescence of the Commissioners to the positions taken by the staff.
In contrast, the Commission will accept an appeal when it disagrees with the staff's position and will often reverse. 63 To avoid this administrative embarrassment, the staff has an incentive to proactively implement interpretations that will be acceptable to the Commission. In particular, this may require alterations as administrations change and the regulatory position of the Commission shifts.
The staff's ability to change its interpretation under the "ordinary business" exclusion is facilitated by the lack of substantive impact typically associated with proposals that implicate the exclusion. Although the exclusion is intended to prevent shareholder interference in the prerogative of the board, the proposals have almost no meaningful possibility of doing so. , that the Commission not review the merits of the matter."). Where the SEC agrees with the staff position, it will usually accept this advice. Doing so reduces the SEC's workload and provides some additional protection in any resulting legal challenge. Id. at 1039-40 ("It is fairly well settled that if the Commission accepts the staff's recommendation, i.e., it does not review the merits of the adverse response, that decision is not reviewable by the courts. Moreover, because the staff has no authority to make reviewable orders, the effect of a Commission decision not to hear an appeal is to preclude any judicial review of an adverse response. On the other hand, it appears equally well settled that if the Commission determines to review an adverse response, that action is reviewable by the courts.").
512
Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 2 First, they rarely receive majority support from shareholders. 64 Second, they are mostly precatory and request, rather than require, managerial action. As a result, they can be ignored even when approved. Finally, should shareholders ever succeed in adopting a mandatory proposal, directors would be able to challenge the outcome through litigation in state court.
65
As a result, the proposals are in reality mostly efforts by shareholders to bring public attention to potentially embarrassing corporate practices. Management, predictably, seeks to omit proposals falling under this exclusion not because they will actually interfere with its authority but because of the public pillorying that will often result and the pressure for change that will be applied by non-shareholder groups. 66 As a result, the staff's role is less about determining the balance of authority between directors and shareholders and more about determining the parameters of the public debate.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the interpretation of the "ordinary business" exclusion tends to differ among those who favor the use of the proxy process to engender broad public debate on corporate practices and those who do not. This is particularly apparent in the application of the public policy exception. During administrations that give greater weight to managerial concerns, the staff is more likely to narrow and sometimes eliminate consideration of the public policy exception. The effect is to allow management to exclude more potentially critical or embarrassing proposals. Under shareholder-centric administrations, the public policy exception is likely to 64 ) (noting that after proposal calling for nondiscriminatory policies relating to sexual orientation "passed with fifty-eight percent of the shareholder vote, the company agreed to amend its written equal opportunity policy to state that the company does not discriminate based on sexual orientation."). Publicity can attach through the process of seeking SEC authority to delete a proposal. Nonetheless, the process is less apparent and does not result in the distribution of materials to thousands, sometimes even hundreds of thousands of investors.
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The Politicization of Corporate Governance 513 be given a much broader range, allowing shareholders to publicly debate a wider array of corporate practices. The approach taken with respect to proposals dealing with corporate employment practices illustrates this back-and-forth shift that can occur when administrations change. The staff originally found that employmentrelated matters affecting non-executive employees fell within the "ordinary business" of the company. To the extent they involved practices of social importance such as affirmative action or anti-discrimination policies, however, the proposals were generally treated as matters of public policy and could not be omitted under the exclusion.
In 1991, however, at the end of a Republican administration, the Commission accepted an appeal of a proposal addressing a company's affirmative action policies and reversed the staff, concluding that it could be omitted under the "ordinary business" exclusion. 67 The staff rightfully understood that the Commission favored the exclusion of non-executive employment matters even when they implicated public policy concerns and changed its position, something that became clear the following year in Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores.
Cracker Barrel had become embroiled in controversy over alleged discrimination against employees on the basis of sexual orientation.
68 A shareholder proposal was dutifully submitted that requested the adoption of policies designed to prohibit the behavior. Cracker Barrel sought exclusion and despite the prominent public profile of the matter, the staff agreed. 70 The staff conceded that exceptions had "been made in some cases where a proponent based an employment-related proposal on 'social policy' concerns." 71 The distinction, however, had become "increasingly difficult" to determine. 72 Rather than narrow the definition of public policy, the staff opted to impose a bright-line test. 73 Proposals would be excluded if they concerned "a company's employment policies and practices for the general workforce" irrespective of their social importance. 74 In an unusual move, the full Commission affirmed the decision.
75
The position had no real basis in the interpretive lore surrounding the "ordinary business" exclusion. No explanation was provided for the conclusion that employment matters were "uniquely" within the ordinary business of management. The letter did not attempt to square the elimination of social policy considerations with the statement in 1976 that suggested otherwise.
76
Nor was there any discussion of the reasons for applying a bright line test only to employment matters. 77 The staff's shift in position, therefore, was most likely designed to better reflect the Commission's view that Rule 14a-8 was an inappropriate vehicle for encouraging debate over corporate employment practices.
The administration changed in early 1993 although it took several more years before President Clinton succeeding in appointing a majority of Commissioners. 78 Once this was accomplished, the Commission set about revers- ing Cracker Barrel. In the comment process, shareholders almost unanimously favored repeal; managers almost unanimously opposed. 79 In ultimately overturning the decision, the Commission pointed to factors that came to light in the aftermath of the Cracker Barrel decision. 80 Yet in fact the reversal was better explained by a Commission more favorably disposed toward greater debate over corporate employment practices.
The same thing happened with respect to proposals involving public health and the environment. In 2005, the Commission consisted of three Republicans and two Democrats. 81 The staff issued a bulletin narrowing the "ordinary business" exclusion by imposing a "bright line" test that allowed companies to omit proposals involving "an internal assessment of the risks or liabilities that the company faces as a result of its operations that may adversely affect the environment or the public's health."
82 This was true, apparently, irrespective of the social importance of the issue within the proposal.
In Cracker Barrel fashion, the staff bulletin never explained why risk assessment was invariably a matter of "ordinary business," nor did it discuss why the staff chose to dispatch with public policy implications only in cases of risk analysis and only those involving the environment and public health. Finally, the bulletin did not explain the distinction between those proposals three of President Bush (Roberts, Beese and Schapiro). Only in 1996 did President Clinton succeed in appointing a majority of the Commission and in ensuring the presence of three commissioners from his political party. 79 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29106, 29108 (May 28, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) ("Nearly all commenters from the shareholder community who addressed the matter supported the reversal of this position. Most commenters from the corporate community did not favor the proposal to reverse CRACKER BARREL, though many indicated that the change would be acceptable as part of a broader set of reforms."). Much of the impetus for the shift apparently came from a single commissioner. See http://sec. gov/rules/proposed/s72597cn.htm (statement by Commissioner Wallman that he had "repeatedly called for the reversal of Cracker Barrel -independent of any other or more comprehensive reform."). One commentator described the reaction as an "acute dissonance between the views of corporate America and its shareholders regarding" the result. Aaron A. 80 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 43 at 29,108 ("Since 1992, the relative importance of certain social issues relating to employment matters has reemerged as a consistent topic of widespread public debate. In addition, as a result of the extensive policy discussion that the Cracker Barrel position engendered, and through the rulemaking notice and comment process, we have gained a better understanding of the depth of interest among shareholders in having an opportunity to express their views to company management on employment-related proposals that raise sufficiently significant social policy issues."). 81 See http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm.The Republicans consisted of Chairman Donaldson and commissioners Glassman and Atkins. The Democrats consisted of commissioners Goldschmid and Campos.
82 SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C (CF) (June 28, 2005), available at http://www.sec. gov/interps/legal/cfslb14c.htm ("To the extent that a proposal and supporting statement focus on the company engaging in an internal assessment of the risks or liabilities that the company faces as a result of its operations that may adversely affect the environment or the public's health, we concur with the company's view that there is a basis for it to exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(7) as relating to an evaluation of risk.").
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Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 2 that required risk analysis and those that did not. 83 Given that "most corporate decisions involve some evaluation of risk," 84 companies used the staff position to challenge other types of proposals, even those that did not actually reference risk analysis. 85 The interpretation did not last long. Following the election of a Democratic President in 2008, the political tilt of the Commission changed. 86 The staff almost immediately jettisoned the position, acknowledging that the analytical framework "may have resulted in the unwarranted exclusion of proposals that relate to the evaluation of risk but that focus on significant policy issues." 87 The staff also questioned the premise that risk analysis never implicated public policy. 88 Proposals would thereafter be analyzed based upon the subject matter, with the need for risk analysis "not dispositive."
89 Consistent with the reversal in Cracker Barrel, the staff reinstated the case-bycase approach. 90 There are numerous other examples of similar positions taken in one administration and reversed in another. In 2006, the staff upheld the exclusion of a proposal submitted by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Pension Benefit Fund to Comcast calling for limits in a severance agreement of no more than 2.99 times salary. 91 Four years later with a change in administration, 92 the staff took a different position in an almost 83 The release merely provided that if the proposal did not involve risk assessment, it could not be excluded. See id. ("To the extent that a proposal and supporting statement focus on the company minimizing or eliminating operations that may adversely affect the environment or the public's health, we do not concur with the company's view that there is a basis for it to exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(7)."). 84 ("In determining whether the subject matter raises significant policy issues and has a sufficient nexus to the company, as described above, we will apply the same standards that we apply to other types of proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(7)."). 
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94
III. SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF THE OUTSIDE AUDITOR
Since the 1930s, shareholders have routinely been given the right to ratify a company's auditors. Likewise, the SEC has a long history of encouraging the practice, including successful efforts to lobby Congress to include the authority in the Investment Company Act of 1940. 95 The position was reflected in the staff's interpretation of Rule 14a-8. Proposals calling for shareholder approval of auditors were regularly submitted and routinely included in proxy statements. 96 Indeed, some of the earliest litigation involving the rule arose when the SEC sought to enjoin a company from omitting a proposal calling for shareholder ratification from its proxy materials. (the staff initially agreed that the proposal could be omitted because it "has been substantially implemented by the Company's decision to include its existing severance agreements among the disclosures that will be subject to the Company's say-on-pay vote pursuant to Section 14A(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."). Following an appeal, however, the staff quickly reconsidered and agreed that the proposal could not be excluded. Id., at *1-2. ("Upon reconsideration, we are unable to concur in Navistar's view that it may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(10). The proposal urges the board to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for future severance agreements in which the company contemplates paying out more than two times the sum of an executive's base salary plus bonus. The proposal does not request a. shareholder vote on severance agreements already entered into and disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K. We note that Navistar does not appear to have a policy of having to obtain shareholder approval for future severance agreements. Accordingly, we do not believe that Navistar may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(10)."). 94 Tyson Foods, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 5149212, at *1 (Dec. 15, 2009) ("After reviewing the information contained in your letter, the Division grants the reconsideration request. Upon reconsideration, we are unable to concur in Tyson's view that it may exclude the proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). That provision allows the omission of a proposal that 'deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations.' While two prior no-action responses from 2002 and 2003 permitted companies to rely on that rule to exclude comparable proposals relating to the use of antibiotics in livestock production, we believe that those positions should now be reversed."). Although noting the existence of two prior letters allowing for exclusion of the proposal, the staff in Tyson Foods, Inc. noted that antimicrobial resistance through the use of antibiotics in livestock had generated "widespread public debate." The staff justified the decision based upon developments that had occurred after the earlier letters. Id. at *5 ("In arriving at this position, we note that since 2006, the European Union has banned the use of most antibiotics as feed additives and that legislation to prohibit the non-therapeutic use of antibiotics in animals absent certain safety findings relating to antimicrobial resistance has recently been introduced in Congress."). 95 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31(a) (2011). 96 See infra notes 109, 121; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-32(a) (2011). The requirement only applied where funds held an annual meeting. See also Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment Company Regulation, 1992 SEC LEXIS 3489, at *604 (May 1992) ("Shareholders also are required to ratify the selection of public accountants previously made by the independent directors, but only if an annual meeting of shareholders is held. If no annual meeting is held, the selection of auditors is left to the discretion of the independent directors.") (footnote omitted).
97 Infra notes 112-114.
518
In 2005, however, the staff quietly issued a series of No-Action letters allowing companies to exclude auditor ratification proposals under the "ordinary business" exclusion. The letters contained no explanation for the sudden departure from the half century-old position nor did they make any attempt to reconcile the view with the public importance of the issue. The interpretation also conflicted with actual practice; most large public companies extended ratification rights to their shareholders.
98
A. The SEC and Shareholder Approval of Auditors
Companies routinely ask shareholders to ratify the choice of outside auditors, 99 a practice that apparently began in the 1930s. 100 Unlike the laws in other common law countries, 101 however, states do not mandate the prac- 101 See, e.g., INDUSTRY CANADA, GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE CANADA COR-PORATIONS ACT PART II, available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cd-dgc.nsf/vwapj/13-1E_ 23-04-07.pdf/$file/13-1E_23-04-07.pdf. ("Each corporation is required to prepare annual financial statements for examination by the auditor. These statements will be presented to the members at the annual meeting along with the report of the auditor."). Canada has had the requirement in place since 1927. See Hawes, supra note 99, at 4. The requirement also exists in the United Kingdom, see Companies Act (c. 46), 2006 § 489, and has been in place since 1844. Hawes, supra note 99, at 4.
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The Politicization of Corporate Governance 519 tice, 102 despite occasional calls that they do so. 103 The one state that required shareholder ratification repealed the provision in the 1970s. 104 Following the adoption of the Exchange Act, the SEC emphasized the importance of shareholder ratification. In McKesson & Robbins, Inc., the SEC issued a Section 21(a) Report addressing the fraud committed by McKesson & Robbins. 105 The Company had reported fictitious sales and assets. 106 The SEC viewed the audit as deficient and blamed the results at least in part on the selection process for the outside auditor. With the process dominated by management, the SEC recommended the "[e]lection of auditors for the current year by vote of the stockholders at the annual meeting." 106 See id. at 2. 107 Id. at 3. In addition, the SEC recommended that the "auditors . . . be required to attend meetings of the stockholders at which their report is presented to answer questions thereon, to state whether or not they have been given all the information and access to all the books and records which they have required, and to have the right to make any statement or explanation they desire with respect to the accounts. Section 32 of the Investment Company Act ultimately required that the outside accountant be submitted for "ratification or rejection" at the annual meeting, 109 although disinterested directors could fill vacancies that occurred between meetings. 110 The benefit was described as "psychological," but one that would "bring home to the independent public accountant that . . . under the existing statutes and existing practice [the] independent public accountant is really acting for the security holders rather than for the management." 111 Likewise, the SEC took a dim view toward attempts to exclude proposals calling for auditor approval by shareholders and, in at least one case, sought to enjoin a company from doing so. 112 In SEC v. Transamerica Corp., Transamerica opted, over the objection of the SEC, to exclude a number of shareholder proposals, including one calling for shareholder ratification of the firm's auditor. 113 The proxy statement did reveal that a stockholder would "present for action" a proposal at the meeting "to require that independent public auditors should be elected by the stockholders," but did not otherwise include the text of the proposal or provide space to vote on the proxy card.
The SEC brought an injunctive proceeding challenging Transamerica's actions. 114 In determining whether the proposal amounted to a "proper sub-109 Role of Indep. Directors of Inv. Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 42007, 70 SEC Docket 1867, 1883 (Oct. 14, 1999) ("The Investment Company Act requires that a fund's independent directors select the fund's independent public accountant. The Act further requires that the selection of the fund's independent public accountant be submitted to shareholders for ratification or rejection at their next annual meeting."). 110 See id. (noting that shareholders rarely contest votes over the ratification of the selection of a fund's independent accountant causing many people to believe that shareholder ratification has become perfunctory), 111 21, 1943) , available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 1943/012143obrien.pdf ("For stockholders, once given a right to make their own proposals for action at annual meetings, chose as one of the early subjects of their concern the relationship of accountants to management and stockholders.").
113 Id at 513. 114 Id.
The Politicization of Corporate Governance 521 ject for action" by shareholders, 115 the Court described the right of shareholders to ratify the independent auditor as "proper and common" and could find no basis for excluding the proposal. The Court stated that: No cogent reason has been advanced why the proposal to have independent public auditors of the books of the corporation elected by stockholders (beginning with the annual meeting of 1947, and a representative of the auditing firm so chosen attend the annual meeting each year) is not a proper subject matter to come before the annual meeting . . . . With respect to the annual meeting of defendant Transamerica, management by the exercise of procedural limitations had no right to omit this particular Gilbert proposal from the notice of the annual meeting to be sent to all stockholders.
116
Characterizing the auditors as holding a position of trust, the Court mused that "it would be an odd legal relationship whereby trustee has conclusive discretion over the method and person who shall review the trustee's accounts."
117
The Third Circuit affirmed in a somewhat exasperated tone.
118 "Surely the audit of a corporation's books may not be considered to be peculiarly within the discretion of the directors. A corporation is run for the benefit of its stockholders and not for that of its managers."
119 Appointment of an auditor by shareholders was "beyond any question" a "proper subject for action by the stockholders."
120
Although not addressing the "ordinary business" exclusion in Rule 14a-8 (it had not yet been adopted), the reasoning of both courts effectively precluded its application. The analysis reflected the view that ratification of auditors was not an "ordinary" matter within the purview of the board but, given the gatekeeper role of accounting firms, was an appropriate subject for shareholders.
In the aftermath of the decision, shareholder proposals seeking approval of auditors were common and routinely included in the proxy materials, 116 Id. at 333. See also id. at 333-34 ("Furthermore, there is no provision in the Delaware Corporation Law from which the conclusion is inescapable that such a right must be exclusively exercised by the directors on the theory that the stockholders have delegated every conceivable piece of business, with respect to the affairs of the corporation, to the directors. Here, the stockholders, as beneficial owners of the enterprise, may prefer to consider the selection of independent auditors to review what is no more than the trust relationship which exists between the directors and stockholders.").
117 Id. at 334. 118 See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 516 (3d Cir. 1947) ("The court below took the view, in our opinion, fully supportable, that the stockholders as the beneficial owners of the enterprise may prefer to consider the selection of independent auditors to review 'what is no more than the trust relationship which exists between the directors and stockholders.").
119 Id. at 517. 120 Id. 121 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 1979 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3848, at *6 (Dec. 12, 1979) ("The First Letter contains two proposals: (i) a request that the selection of Firestone's independent public accountants be submitted for stockholder ratification and (ii) a request that the names and addresses of all stockholders who sponsor resolutions be printed in 522
Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 2 with some receiving majority support. 122 In 1960, the Chairman of the SEC described them as "popular proposals." 123 Likewise, the SEC occasionally reiterated the inapplicability of exclusions in Rule 14a-8 to auditor ratification proposals. 124 Proposals calling for ratification of auditors were occasionally excluded but only on grounds that were narrow or procedural. 125 The only common basis was mootness, 126 and then only when the board effectively agreed to management's proxy statement along with the resolutions they present. Firestone currently intends to include these two proposals in management's proxy statement."); see also 123 Edward N. Gadsby, Address before the American Society of Corporate Secretaries (June 7, 1960), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1960/060760gadsby.pdf at 1 ("Other popular proposals related to changing or rotating the place of the annual meeting, furnishing postmeeting reports, approval of independent accountants by stockholders, restrictions on bonus plans and reduction of management compensation."). 124 See, e.g., Solicitations of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 9784, 1972 WL 125400, at *2 (Sept. 22, 1972) (amendments designed to allow for omission of proposals "not significantly related to the business of the issuer or not within its control" were not intended to "serve as a basis for the omission of traditional shareholder proposals dealing with stockholder relationships with the management, such as cumulative voting, annual meetings and ratification of auditors, since all these matters can be considered significantly related to the issuer's business or within its control[.]") (emphasis added). 125 See, e.g., The Washington Post Company, 1973 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1447, at *3 (Feb. 22, 1973) (proposal excluded because proposing shareholders lacked the authority to vote on the matter; if proposal made at meeting, shareholder would be "ruled out of order"). A single letter did allow for the exclusion of a proposal calling for shareholder ratification but only on a temporary basis. Excalibur Technologies Corporation, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 570, at *7 (May 4, 1998) (allowing exclusion of shareholder approval proposal where company asserted that during seven month period it would "not necessarily . . . be in a position to definitively select the accounting firm to perform the audit in the following January."). See, e.g., Safeguard Scientific, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286394, at *1 (Mar. 2, 1990) (shareholder allegedly did not meet the ownership requirements for submitting a proposal).
126 See, e.g., Corning Natural Gas. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL30779 at *1 (Feb. 16, 1983) (allowing for exclusion on the grounds of mootness of a provision calling for auditors to be present at annual meeting where "the Company's independent auditors have agreed to attend the annual meeting, and that the Company will include a statement to that effect in its proxy materials."). implement the practice. 127 Indeed, shareholder ratification emerged as a basis for excluding other proposals, particularly those seeking to impose qualitative standards on the selection of the auditor.
128
The consistency of the approach could be contrasted with other proposals that sought to constrain the selection of auditors by the board. Proposals seeking to require guidelines, 129 impose mandatory rotation, 130 LEXIS 1590, at *2 (Jan. 3, 1986) (concurring in company's decision to omit a proposal requiring the rotation of independent auditors at least every five years). 130 Cmty., Bancshares, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 426, at *42 ( Mar. 15, 1999) (permitting exclusion of proposal requesting that the company's bylaws be amended to require that its independent auditors be a regional or national certified accounting firm and be selected by an independent audit committee); see also Public Service of New Hampshire, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1689, at *1-2 (Jan. 22, 1986) (concluding that company could properly exclude a proposalproviding for the institution of guidelines for the selection of auditors by the ccompany); Consumers Power Co., SEC NoAction Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1599, at *4-5 (Jan. 3, 1986) (sanctioning exclusion of proposal that the "Board of Directors revise as follows the By-laws, etc., relative to share-
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[Vol. 2 amount of disclosure available to shareholders about the auditor were routinely excluded.
131
B. A Shift in Time
The administration changed in 2001 and so did the make-up of the Commission. Chairman Levitt, who served in that position during the entire Clinton administration, resigned and made room for a new Republican chairman, Harvey Pitt. By 2002, President Bush had appointed all five persons serving on the Commission.
132
This Commission confronted growing concern among shareholders about auditor independence. In the aftermath of the collapse of Enron, Congress included in Sarbanes-Oxley a provision designed to reduce managerial control over auditors in exchange traded companies by transferring to the audit committee of the board the authority to hire and fire accounting firms. 133 As the SEC noted in implementing the requirement:
The auditing process may be compromised when a company's outside auditors view their main responsibility as serving the company's management rather than its full board of directors or its audit committee. This may occur if the auditor views management as its employer with hiring, firing and compensatory powers. Under these conditions, the auditor may not have the appropriate incentive to raise concerns and conduct an objective review.
134
Shareholders sought to augment this authority by encouraging companies to submit auditors for ratification. In 2004, shareholders submitted proposals to a series of companies requesting adoption of a policy providing for shareholder ratification of the company's independent auditors. 135 The proposals seemed uncontroversial. Most companies already allowed for shareholder ratification, selection process, and the maximum retention period of the independent accounting firm which is to perform the annual external audit of the Company").
131 LTV Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1078, at *1 ( Dec. 22, 1997) (permitting exclusion of proposal requesting that the board disclose certain financial information regarding the company's auditors in the proxy, statement); Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1120, at *6 (Dec. 11, 1997) (agreeing that a company's management may exclude a proposal requesting that the board provide information regarding the financial capacity of the company's independent auditors to pay claims for malpractice, negligence and fraud). 
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The Politicization of Corporate Governance 525 holder ratification. 136 Moreover, they were precatory and merely "requested" the authority. Finally, the SEC had historically encouraged shareholder ratification. Nonetheless, a number of companies petitioned the SEC for the right to omit the proposals, relying in part on Sarbanes-Oxley. Car company PAC-CAR, for example, argued that shareholder ratification interfered with the role of the audit committee and that selection of an auditor should more appropriately be left to the expertise of directors. 137 Despite the longstanding and consistent position of the SEC, 138 the staff unexpectedly concluded, without analysis or explanation, that the proposal could be omitted under the "ordinary business" exclusion. 139 The public importance of the debate over auditor independence received no mention. In quick order, the position was repeated in other No-Action letters. 140 By 2005, companies routinely received relief authorizing the exclusion of these sorts of proposals. 141 
The Politicization of Corporate Governance 531 concluding that the cost-benefit analysis conducted by the SEC was erroneous. 180 Rulemaking with respect to access, therefore, entailed an eight-year process involving two different administrations. Admittedly, shareholder access involved several unusual circumstances. There was a Second Circuit case that invalidated the SEC's interpretation in 2006 181 and Congress further intervened through the adoption of Dodd-Frank Act § 971. 182 Moreover, the divisiveness among Commissioners was unusually apparent, and the process took a number of unexpected turns. 183 Nonetheless, it shows some of the difficulties in using rulemaking to change SEC policies.
By contrast, shifts in staff interpretations are much easier and quicker to implement and, as this Article illustrates, commonly occur with changes in the political make-up of the Commission. It is no revelation to point out that policies vary with administrations. With the rubric of investor protection and
